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QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF
FLORIDA CASES*
The Florida Supreme Court decided about one hundred and fifty-five
cases during the period reported from February 26, 1953, through April 16,
1953. Those opinions (excluding memorandum decisions and a few
others not considered of sufficient importance to be noted here) found
in 62 So.2d 695 to 63 So.2d 656 are herewith reported. In addition two
federal cases interpretative of Florida law are included. These were
found from 73 S. Ct. 391 to 73 S. Ct. 799 (advance sheets from March
1, 1953, through May 1, 1953); 200 F.2d 569 to 201 F.2d 672 (advance
sheets from February 16, 1953, through March 23, 1953); and 109 F. Supp.
265 to 109 F. Supp. 959 (advance sheets from March 2, 1953, through March
30, 1953).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Immunity: Proprietary function. A govern-
mental agency cannot constitutionally' be immunized from liability for
its torts in the exercise of a proprietary function as distinguished from a
governmental function. Keeping sidewalks in repair is a proprietary
function. 2
ASSIGNMENTS. Ratification. A ratification of a defective assignment
does not make it retroactive to the date of the original assignment.3
ArrORNEYS. Federal Tax Counsel: Admission to Bar. A person who
desires to practice in Florida as a "Federal Tax Counsel", limiting his
appearances to proceedings before Federal courts, departments or com-
missions, must first be qualified to practice law in the State.4
CONFLICT OF LAWS. Tort action. The rights of parties to a tort action
are governed by the law of the place where the tort was committed.5
CRIMINAL LAW. Bigamy statute. In order to constitute violation of
the bigamy statute" either cohabitation with the second spouse or the
second marriage must occur in Florida.7
Breaking and entering. Assault and battery is one of the misdemeanors
*This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by Richard Goodman and edited
by Lewis Cosor.
1. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights § 4.
2. Woods v. City of Palatka, 63 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1953).
3. Could v. Green, 63 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1953).
4. Rules of Integration of the Florida Bar, art. 2, subd. 2; Petition of Kearney,
63 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1953).
5. Astor Electric Service v. Cabrera, 62 So2d 759 (Fla, 1953).
6. FLA. STAT. § 799.01 (1951).
7. Wills v. State, 63 So. Zd 184 (Fla. 1953).
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contemplated by the statute which makes a crime of breaking and entering
with intent to commit a misdemeanor.'
Habitual Criminal Act. For the purposes of the Habitual Criminal
Act,' several felony convictions entered on the same day are considered
one.11 ' ', .r
Plea of guilty: Withdrawal. Permitting withdrawal of a plea of guilty
in a criminal trial is discretionary with the trial judge. 12
Sentence: Relief. Where a trial judge imposes a sentence that is within
the limits defined by statute, further relief by a reduction of the term is a
matter purely within the province of the parole authorities. 8
DECLARATORY JucrxAErr. Power to entertain. The Declaratory Judg-
ments Act14 may be invoked in any case where technical or social advances
have obscured or placed in doubt one's rights, immunities, status or privi-
leges.' 5
DIVORCE. Alimony: Security. Where one shows a disposition to leave
the jurisdiction of the state without making provisions to meet alimony and
support payments, it is within the discretion of the chancellor to require
security for their payment.'5
Denial: Fixing of property rights. When a di'orce is denied there is
no reason, to explore and fix the respective interests of the parties.17
Desertion: Nonsupport. Evidence tending to prove nonsupport is
material on the question of whether a husband has, in fact, deserted his
wife. 8
Desertion: Tolled by divorce proceedings. Running of the statute0
making willful, obstinate and continued desertion for one year ground for
divorce is stopped while bona fide divorce proceedings are pending between
the parties.20
Grounds: Welfare of parties. The general welfare of the parties is not
a ground for divorce in Florida.2'
Nullified divorce: Not tolling desertion statute. A wife obtained a
divorce which was subsequently nullified by the court'rendering it, and the
husband knew at the time of the decree of the facts which were the basis
for the nullification, Held, the statute2 2 making willful, obstinate, and
8. FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (1951).
9. Vawter v. State, 63 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1953).
10. FLA. STAT. § 775.10 (1951).
11. Smith v. Mayo, 63 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1953).
12. FLA. STAT. § 909.13 (1951); La Barbera v. State, 63 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1953).
13. La Barbera v. State, 63 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1953).
14. FLA. STAT. C. 87 (1951).
15. Overman v. State Board of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952).
16. Landy v. Landy, 62 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1953).
17. Zook v. Zook, 63 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1953).
18. Betts v. Betts, 63 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1953).
19. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(7) (1951).
20. Betts v. Betts, 63 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1953).
21. Hippel v. Hippel, 63 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1953).
22. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(7) (1951).
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continued desertion for one year ground for divorce is not tolled by the
subsequently nullified divorce. 23
EQUITY. Specific performance. Although equity will not relieve a
party from a bad bargain, neither will it enforce performance of a contract
where to do so would be harsh and inequitable.2
4
ESTATES. Dower: U.S. Savings Bonds. U.S. Savings Bonds, registered
in the name of the deceased and payable on his death to his widow, be-
came the absolute property of the widow as designated survivor, and did
not become a part of the estate of the deceased for purposes of computing
dower.25
EVIDENCE. Admissibility: Affidavits of jurors. On a motion to set
aside a verdict, affidavits of jurors are never admissible to show what was in
a juror's mind when he approved the verdict or to reveal the circumstances
which prompted the jury's conclusion. 26
Admissibility: Lie detector. Testimony that prosecuting witness vol-
untarily submitted to a lie detector test prior to the time of trial, offered
for the purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of the prosecuting witness,
is inadmissible.2 7
Circumstantial: Weight. When circumstantial evidence alone is relied
upon to establish any controverted fact it must exclude every hypothesis
other than that consistent with the theory which warrants recovery. Other-
wise circumstantial evidence cannot be given the force of proof.28
Dead man's statute: Cross-examination. The existence of a dead man's
statute29 does not place any limitation on the legitimate scope of cross.
examination, as distinguished from the situation where a party is called to
the stand to testify on his own behalf on direct examination.30
Dead man's statute: Waiver of incompetency. By calling and examin-
ing as a witness one who under the dead man's statute 1 is incompetent to
testify concerning transactions with the deceased, the party for whose benefit
or protection such disqualification was created waives the incompetency of
such witness with respect to matters concerning which the witness is
examined.32
Improper evidence: Curing error. When improper evidence is elicited
or volunteered, or when improper conduct on the part of an attorney occurs,
the charge of the trial court directing the jury to disregard such testimony
or such conduct, cures the error and corrects the irregularity. 3
23. Betts v. Betts, 63 So.Zd 302 (Fla. 1953).
24. Schuetz v. Niziolek, 62 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1953).
25. FL. STAT. § 731.34 (1951); In re Brock's Estate, 63 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1953).
26. Astor Electric Service v. Cabrera, 62 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1953).
27. Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
28. City of Jacksonville v. Waldrep, 62 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1953).
29. FLA. StrA. § 90.05 (1951).
30. Embrey v. Southern Gas & Electric Corp., 63 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1953).
31. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1951).
32. Embrey v. Southern Gas & Electric Corp., 63 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1953).
33. Lambert v. Higgins, 63 So.2d 631 (Fla .1953).
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FAMILY LAW. 'Custody: Modification of decree. jurisdiction to mod-
ify a decree relating to the custody of the children of the divorced parties is
not dependent upon an express reservation in the original decree. 4
jurisdiction over minor children. Jurisdiction of the court over the
custody of minor children of divorced parents does not abate upon the death
of one of the divorced parents."'
FLORIDA ELECTIONS. Re-registration of freeholders. Re-registration"' of
the freeholders of a county is a valid and lawful basis for determining that
a majority37 of the qualified electors residing in the court who were free-
holders participated in the election.3 8
GUEST STATUTES. Contributory Negligence. Contributory negligence
may be imposed as a defense in an action under the guest statute 9 which
requires the claimant to show "gross negligence" and "willful and wanton
misconduct."40
JUDGMENTS. Condemnation proceedings: Collateral attack. A con-
demnation judgment cannot be collaterally attacked except in cases of fraud
or where it is void for want of jurisdiction.4 '
Estoppel by judgment. A judgment on the merits in one suit between
parties on the same cause of action by a court of competent jurisdiction
operates as an estoppel in another suit not only as to matters offered, but
also as to every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated
and determined in that action.42
An adverse final judgment entered in a prior suit brought under the
wrongful death statute 43 operates as an estoppel by judgment and bars recov-
ery in a subsequent suit by the personal representative of decedent, instituted
under the survival of action statute,44 where both suits were based on the
same act of negligence and when the benefits of favorable judgments in
both suits would inure to the same parties.4
Summary judgments. Summary judgments should be granted sparingly
and only in those cases where there remains no genuine issue of any material
fact 48
LIBEL AND SLANDER. Requisite notice. A condition precedent to the
filing of a charge for criminal libe 47 is the giving of notice in writing48 five
34. Cone v. Cone, 62 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1953).
35. Cone v. Cone, 62 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1953).
36. FLA. STAT. § 97.081 (1951).
37. FLA. CONST, Art. IX, § 6.
38. State v. County of Sarasota, 62 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1953).
39. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1951).
40. Henley v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953).
41. Carlor v. City of Miami, 62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953).
42. Miami Retreat Foundation v. Ervin, 62 So.2d 748 (Ma. 1953).
43. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1951).
44. FLA. SrAT. § 45.11 (1951).
45. Rehe v. Airport U-Drive, Inc., 63 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1953).
46. Williams v. City of Lake City, 62 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1953).
47. FLA. STAT. § 836.07 (1951).
48. FLA. STAT. § 836.03 (1951).
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days before the institution of the suit specifying the newspaper article and
the statements therein alleged to be false and defamatory. Failure to allege
in the criminal. information that such notice has been given invalidates the
information.49
LICErNsEs. Real estate. The Florida Real Estate Law 0 does not
require a non-resident president of a Florida real estate corporation to
hold an active real estate broker's license. The corporation can recover a
commission where a contract was signed by the president outside the state
if the corporation was qualified to do business in Florida and was registered
as an active broker as was its Florida vice-president who performed all neces-
sary acts and services in Florida in connection with the contract. 5
LIENS. Mechanics' liens: Final payment under contract. A final
payment by the owner to the general contractor under a construction con-
tract without securing an affidavit from the general contractor stating that
all lienors were paid in full or the name and amount due each unpaid lienor
subjects the owner's building to liability to subcontractor's and materialmen "2
to the extent of the final payment even though cautionary notice was not
given by thoseclaiming the lien.53
Mechanics' liens: Liability of owner. If, in the face of a cautionary
notice served by a materialman upon the owner of property where improve-
ments are being erected, the owner pays over to the general contractor the
entire amount due on the contract, then hc does so at his peril54 and must
be held liable for the amount of the lien asserted by the materialman. 55
Mechanics' liens: Sworn statement. In order for a final payment by
an owner to a general contractor under a building contract to be properly
made" under the Mechanics' Lien Law," a sworn statement, stating that
all lienors have been paid in full or showing the name and amount due each
lienor not paid must be secured before the final payment5 9
Mechanics' liens: Waiver of affidavit. 'rhe sworn statement required
by the Mechanics' Lien Law 6' to be given by the general contractor to the
contractor to the owner under a building contract is for the protection of
the subcontractors and materialnen as well as the owner, and therefore, the
owner may not waive it without causing the final payment to be "improp-
erly made" under the statute. 2
49. In re Rice, 62 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1953).
50. FLA. S'rAT. c. 475 (1951).
51. Pearce v. Previews, 201 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1953).
52. FLA. SrAT. §§ 84.01 et seq. (1951).
53. Curtis v. McCardel, 63 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1953).
54, FL. STAT. §§ 84.02, 84.04, 84.05, 84.06 (1951).
55, Bensam Corp. v. Felton, 63 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953).
56. FLA. STAT. § 84.05 (1951),
37. FLA. STAr. c. 84 (1951).
58. FIA. STAT. § 84.04(3) (1951).
59. Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co., 63 Su.2d 264 (Fla. 1953).
60. FLAt. STAT. § 84.04(3) (1951).
61. FLA. STAT., C. 84 (1951).
62. Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co., 63 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1953).
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LIMrTATION OF ACTIONS. Equity. Equity will follow-the law and en-
force the statute of limitations 3 where io cause for action for fraud is
alleged and the plaintiff knew long before expiration of the period of limita-
tions all the facts of which he complains."4
MORTGAGES. Tender of arrears. A tender of arrears due on a mortgage
note containing an optional acceleration clause, made before the holder of
the mortgage note has notified the maker in some effective manner of the
exercise of his option, prevents the exercise of such option.A
MOTOR VEHICLES. Licenses: Suspension. Suspension 6 of a person's
driver's license without a preliminary hearing meets every requirement of due
process where there is a provision for hearing 7 after suspension but before
revocation.""
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Bonds: Approval by freeholders. A
municipality is not authorized to issue special obligation stockade certifi-
cates, the principle and interest of which is to be paid solely from the pro-
ceeds of fines and forfeitures arising from sentences imposed by the .munici-
pal court of the city, without an approving vote of the freeholders.A9 -.
Sidewalk: Duty to repair. A city is not relieved of its duty to exercise
reasonable diligence in repairing defects in sidewalks by the fact that it may,
by ordinance, require the owner of a lot to repair the sidewalk abutting his
property. Upon failure of the owner to comply, the city may then have
such sidewalk repaired and the costs charged against such owner as a lien
against the lot.70
Terms of city commissioners: Contracts. When the terms of city
commissioners are staggered and expire at different times, the city commis-
sion is a continuing body and may contract for any reasonable time since
there is no point at which the terms of all commissioners come to an end.71
Venue. Actions against municipal corporations are inherently local,
and, therefore, those corporations must be sued in the county in which they
are located.72
Zoning. With reference to zoning, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the municipality but will 'ustain the legislative intent
of the ordinance if the matter is "fairly debatable."73
NEGLICENCE. Imputed: Guest passenger. Negligence of the driver of
an automobile is imputable to his guest when such guest knows, or by the
exercise of ordinary and reasonable care should know fron the circumstances
63. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1951).
64. Voliva v. Bennett, 201 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1953).
65. River Holding Co. v. Nickel, 62 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1952).
66. FLA, STAT. § 322.27(l)(b) (1951).
67. FLA, STAT. § 322.31(1)(2) (1951).
68. Thornhill v, Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740(Fla. 1953).
69. FL, CONST. Art. IX, § 6; State v. City of Miami, 63 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1953).
70. Woods v. City of Palatka, 63 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1953).
71. Daly v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1953).
72. Williams v. City of Lake City, 62 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1953).
73. City of Miami Beach v. Elsalto Real Estate, 63 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1953).
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of the occasion, that the driver is not exercising that degree of care in the
operation of the vehicle compatible with the safety of his passenger."
Last clear chance. Where the negligence of the litigants is concur-
rent, the doctrine of "last clear chance" is not applicable."
Statute of Limitations: Concealment. Where a dentist has fraudu-
lently concealed the facts showing negligence, the statute of limitations 8
is tolled until the fraud is penetrated and the facts are discovered or until
they should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence by
the injured patient.' 7
Violation of penal statute. Where a manufacturer mislabels a product,
he violates a penal statute 8 imposing upon him a duty designed to protect
another and is negligent and liable, as a matter of law, to the ultimate
consumer.'9
PROCEDURE. Depositions: Matter of right. Where the wife asserts a
claim for support and maintenance money and the husband neither counter-
claims nor offers an affirmative defense, she is not entitled, as a matter of
right, 0 to an order requiring the husband to travel at great expense and
inconvenience, in order to take his deposition.8 '
Masters: Findings. A chancellor may not set aside the findings of a
master unless they are "clearly erroneous" or against the clear weight of the
evidence. 82
Motion for production and inspection. Granting a motion for produc-
tion and inspection 3 is a matter of discretion and not of right.84
Reinstatement. Vhere two actions are consolidated solely for trial and
then dismissed, reinstatement of one8'5 does not require reinstatement of the
other.1
Reinstatement of action: Good cause. That plaintiff was "sojourning
in Europe" is not good cause for reinstatement of a case under Florida stat-
ute, which provides that after a cause of action has been dismissed for lack
of prosecution, 7 it may be reinstated by petition "upon good cause shown to
the court."88
Res judicata: Identity of facts. The test of the identity of the causes
74. Loftin v. Bryan, 63 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1953).
75. Yousko v. Vogt. 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953).
76. FL.A. STAT. C. 95 (1951).
77. Proctor V. Schomberg, 63 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1953).
78. Fix. STAT. §§ 578.09, 578.13(1)(b) (1951).
79. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
80. Fla. Common Law Rule 30(d) (1951).
81. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 63 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1953).
82. Spencer v. Young, 63 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1953).
83. Fla. Common Law Rule 27 (1951).
84. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Hawthorne Flying Service, 63 So.2d
308 (Fla. 1953).
85. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1951).
86. B & L Trucking Co., Inc. v, Loftin, 63 So.2d 276 (FIla. 1953).
87. FLA. STAr. § 45.19 (1951).
88. Railway Exp. Agency v. Hoagland, 62 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1953),
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of action, for the purpose of determining the question of res judicata, is the
identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions.89
Statute of Limitations: Affirmative defense. It is reversible error to
dismiss a complaint on the ground that on its face it shows that it is barred
by the statute of limitations.9 To take advantage of the statute of limita-
tions, it must be pleaded as an affirmative defense,"' not contained in a
motion to dismiss.9 2
Trial by Jury: Discretion. It is not an abuse of discretion for the court
to grant a jury trial"3 where it is first demanded on the day of trial.9 '
REAL PROPERTY. After acquired title. A person who conveys land
in which he has no interest by warranty deed, but who afterwards acquires
title to the same land, will not be permitted to claim in opposition to his
outstanding warranty deed against his grantee or those claiming under his
grantee. 95
Conveyances. A deed takes effect upon delivery and nothing passes
until then. The fact that grantee bad possession of the deed does not
necessarily show delivery.""
Dedication. Issuance by a governmental subdivision of a certifi-
cate of approval of a plat required as a condition precedent to recording the
plat 17 does not amount to a formal acceptance of the offer to dedicate. The
statute is merely declaratory of the common law rule that there must be a
showing of a fonnal acceptance of an offer to dedicate land for public use
or an acceptance by public user by clear, satisfactory, and unequivocal proof
before it can be said that land so offered for dedication has actually been
accepted?8
Homestead. Homestead property, held by the entireties, loses its
homestead character on the death of one of the spouses unless the surviv-
ing spouse becomes the head of the family and continues to occupy the
property with his family as homestead?"
Parol gift. Equity will not enforce a parol gift of land without
conclusive proof of words showing an intent to give the land, proof that
possession was taken in reliance on the gift and proof that the donee made
permanent and valuable improvements in anticipation of the gift with the
donor's acquiescence. 10
Statutory eviction. Only a court of equity has the power to relieve
89. Betts v. Betts, 63 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1953).90. Fi-A. S'rAT., C. 95 (1951).
91. FtA. STAT. Common Law Rule 9(d) (1951).
92. Proctor v. Schomberg, 63 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1953).
93. FiA. STAT. Common Law Rule 31 (1951).
94. Wood v. Warriner, 62 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1953).
95. Nottingham v. Denison, 63 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1953).
96. Bould v. Coe, 63 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1953).
97. FLA. STAr. § 177.10 (1951).
98. Board of County Comm'rs of Highlands County v. F. A. Sebrirg Realty Co.,
63 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1953).
99. Passmore v. Morrison, 63 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1953).
100. Green v. Price, 63 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1953).
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a tenant from a forfeiture of his estate because of a failure to pay rent
at the time required by the terms of his lease. Therefore, a prior judgment
for the landlord in a statutory eviction proceeding' 01 does not preclude
relief in equity. 0 2
TORTS. False imprisonment. A person who has arranged for the re-
lease of one accused of crime is not chargeable with false imprisonment if
he causes the accused to be rearrested even though he was furnished with
hearsay evidence to establish that charges were dropped. The "surety" is
entitled to the record showing that charges have been dropped. 03
WARRANTIES. Implied: Manufacturers. An ultimate consumer who
purchases a food product from a retailer may maintain an action directly
against the manufacturer for injuries sustained as the result of a foreign
substance in the food product upon the theory of implied warranty of
wholesomeness.10 4
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Statute of Limitations: Tolling. A stat-
ute of limitation '05 requiring a claimant in a workmen's compensation case to
bring request for a review of order rejecting claim "at any time prior to one
year after the rejection of a claim" on a showing of a change in condition
or a mistake in a determination in fact, is not tolled by the pendency of liti-
gation provoked by the claimant's own acts. 00
, WILLS. Exempt property: Charging. A command of a will to "pay
all my just debts and funeral expenses as soon after my decease as conveni-
ently may be" is sufficient to charge personal property of the estate, exempt
from forced sale under process of court, 07 with payment of funeral ex-
penses. 08
Life estate: Lapse. A devise of a life estate with remainder over does
not lapse when the life tenant predeceases the testator in the absence of a
contrary intent. 09
Mutual: Violation of agreement. Where the survivor of the creators
of mutual and reciprocal wills prepares a subsequent will contrary to the
agreement, the equities will lie with the survivor's second wife under the
subsequent will as opposed to his first wife's daughter who would have been
the beneficiary tinder the mutual will, provided the second wife did not
have actual or constructive knowledge of the mutual will at the time of
the marriage."10
101. FA. STAT. C. 83 (1951).
102. Nevins Drug Co. v. Bunch, 63 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1953).
103. 'Thornas v. Taigman, 63 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1953).
104. Florida Coca.Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1953).
105. FLA, STAT. § 440.28 (1951).
106. Davis v. Combination Awning & Shutter Co., 62 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1953).
107. FLA. CoNsT. Art, X, § 1.
108. In re Hawkins' Estate, 63 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1953).
109. In re Sheaf's Estate, 63 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1953).
110. Fuller v. Tod, 63 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1953).
